The Defence Intelligence of Ukraine (DIU), in the “Components in Weapons” section of the War&Sanctions portal, publishes a list of 37 foreign-made electronic components used in the production of Kometa jamming-resistant navigation modules, data on 28 companies involved in manufacturing Kometa modules and supplying electronic components for them, as well as 13 pieces of foreign technological equipment used in their production.
One way to protect onboard systems from electronic warfare (EW) interference is to use Controlled Reception Pattern Antennas (CRPAs), which can filter out interference by adjusting the antenna pattern and applying signal analysis algorithms. This is the method used in Kometa systems.
The standard Kometa, used in modern russian missiles, UAVs, and guided aerial bombs, consists of two main elements: an antenna array with a specific number of patch antennas and a signal processing module based on an Altera Cyclone field-programmable gate array (FPGA), manufactured by Intel’s subsidiary.
The system’s resistance to interference depends on the number and arrangement of patch antennas, as well as the algorithm the FPGA uses to separate the useful signal from interference. Having a specific number of patch antennas in the array enables spatial information about the direction of incoming interfering radiation to be obtained and its effects to be compensated for.
The enemy is now using Kometa systems with 16 patch antennas at scale, while work is underway to organize the serial production of 20-element arrays. The use of CRPAs manufactured in China and alabuha, featuring 32 antennas, has also been confirmed.
The developer and main manufacturer of Kometa modules in various configurations is the russian company VNIIR-Progress, which belongs to the ABS Electro group of companies associated with sanctioned pro-russian Serbian politician Nenad Popović. VNIIR-Progress holds patents for key technical solutions underlying the design and operation of Kometa systems. One of the authors of the relevant inventions is vladimir nazarovich kharisov, whose daughter, irina vladimirovna kharisova, currently heads the group’s main company, ABS Electro.
Another company in the group handles the procurement of components for module production: VNIIR JSC. Its suppliers include Chinese distributors and sellers of microelectronics, as well as russian intermediaries.
To fulfill orders for Kometa modules from russian military-industrial complex enterprises — which in 2026 already significantly exceed 100,000 units across various configurations — VNIIR-Progress uses its own production facilities and those of other group companies, including VNIIR JSC and ABS ZEIM Avtomatizatsiya JSC. It also engages contract manufacturers, including Pantes, Aviv, PSB Technologies, Erikon, Vector Group, and others.
The main customers for Kometa systems are manufacturers of russian cruise and ballistic missiles, strike UAVs, guided aerial bombs, and glide munitions.
The full list of 28 russian and Chinese companies involved, details of their roles in production and supply, and the foreign equipment used in manufacturing have already been published on the portal.
In addition, today we are publishing a list of 37 foreign-made components used in Kometa systems. The list includes products from nearly 20 manufacturers in the United States, China, Switzerland, Japan, and Taiwan.
The most critical components include Altera Cyclone field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) manufactured by Intel (USA), analog-to-digital and digital-to-analog converters, and radio-frequency integrated circuits produced by the American company Analog Devices and its subsidiary brand, Linear Technology.
It has been established that VNIIR-Progress is constantly seeking alternative supply channels and substitutes for Altera and Analog Devices products, as deliveries have become difficult due to sanctions and tighter export controls.
This demonstrates that sanctions are currently an important tool in countering the aggressor and creating the conditions for a just peace. Increasing sanctions pressure and strengthening enforcement measures can disrupt technology supply chains to russia, constrain the capabilities of the russian military-industrial complex, and weaken russia’s military potential.