Today, 95% of all passenger air travel in russia is carried out using Western-built aircraft, primarily Airbus and Boeing models. Medium- and long-haul routes rely entirely on Western airliners.
A significant portion of this fleet has already exceeded the manufacturer’s certified service life and, under international aviation standards, is no longer considered airworthy. russian operators are unable to extend the service life of Western-built aircraft through certified maintenance because international sanctions imposed in response to russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine have cut them off from authorized support.
As a result, russian airlines are now carrying out repairs and maintenance without the required certifications. Some of the necessary replacement parts are manufactured domestically without following the technological standards established by the original manufacturers and using materials that do not meet the required specifications.
Components that cannot be produced locally are imported through third countries. This applies to both high-tech engine components and interior cabin parts.
In reality, these aircraft remain in service largely because of the inherent reliability of their original design, as well as the quality of components produced by Western manufacturers and maintained by certified service centers before sanctions took effect.
russian airlines also face severe restrictions on international operations. Without risking the seizure of their aircraft abroad, they can operate only around 400 foreign-built aircraft and fewer than 150 russian or soviet-made aircraft on international routes. To circumvent sanctions and reduce the risk of asset seizures, russian operators are reportedly planning to use front leasing companies.
Increasingly, russia has resorted to "aircraft cannibalization"— dismantling some aircraft for spare parts to keep others flying. There have even been documented cases in which brand-new, fully assembled aircraft have been stripped for components to sustain the operation of around a dozen other aircraft.
To replace its dependence on Western aviation technology, russia launched an ambitious aviation development program through 2030, aiming to produce 994 civil aircraft and 765 helicopters. Approximately $12 billion has been allocated for the program. However, even within russia there are serious doubts about the efficiency with which these funds are being spent.
Cut off from Western technologies, russia’s aircraft manufacturing industry has proven incapable of designing and producing components that meet international standards and declared technical specifications. This has led to repeated delays in certification and serial production of domestically developed aircraft. Moreover, technical deficiencies could ultimately prevent these aircraft from operating on international routes altogether.
The MC-21 airliner, intended as a replacement for the Airbus A320 and Boeing 737 families, has already been forced to reduce passenger capacity due to technical issues and problems with the PD-14 engine. Seating capacity has been cut from 210 to 163 passengers. This redesign requires additional engineering work and a new certification process.
Similar problems have affected the PD-8 engines developed for the Sukhoi Superjet, which was intended to compete with the Embraer E-Jet family.
russia has also decided not to procure any new Il-96 aircraft, despite an official government program to purchase 14.
The russian aviation industry is likewise unable to replace the Antonov An-2 and An-24/26 aircraft, as proper maintenance and modernization of these aircraft cannot be carried out without the participation of Ukraine’s Antonov Company.
The LMS-901 Baikal, intended to replace the An-2, has failed to perform many of its predecessor’s functions. Most notably, it cannot safely take off from and land on unprepared dirt airstrips—one of the key advantages of the Ukrainian-designed An-2, despite the aircraft being more than half a century old.
The situation is no better with the Il-114-300, which was supposed to replace the An-24/26. It turned out that the Il-114-300 can operate only from paved runways. The reason is the extremely low placement of its propellers, which are manufactured from materials that fail to meet required standards, creating a high risk of structural failure.
Manufacturing capacity remains another major challenge. russian factories are currently capable of producing only about 26 aircraft per year — far below the output required to achieve the goals of the 2030 aviation program. Expanding production would require substantial additional capital investment.
At present, all modern russian aircraft face another common problem: the lack of access to Western software. Existing Western-built aircraft no longer receive software updates or access to digital aeronautical navigation systems. An additional safety concern stems from the systematic jamming of GPS signals by russian military forces, yet commercial flights continue to operate.
Airport infrastructure also remains in poor condition. A total of 158 airports—nearly two-thirds of russia’s entire airport network — are operating in violation of safety requirements. Another 134 airports require reconstruction or major repairs.
Overall, russia’s civil aviation sector continues its rapid decline as a result of international sanctions, technological isolation, the loss of industrial expertise, and the critical aging of its aircraft fleet. These factors are forcing russian airlines to steadily lower maintenance and operational standards.
Today, flying with russian airlines carries significant risks. No matter how reliable Western-built aircraft may be, russia is no longer capable of providing the maintenance and operating conditions required to ensure their safe and reliable operation.